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IN THE SUPREME COORT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In Re:

ROBERT B. HANSEN
No. 15605

Disciplinary Proceeding

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

POINT ONE

*********
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANT IS ENl'ITLED TO
SPECIAL TREATMENT BECAUSE HE IS ATTORNEY GENERAL.
While sustaining the findings of the Bar Commission
that appellant committed multiple violations of the Code
-of Professional Conduct, the Court did not accept the
recommendation of a one year suspension and simply issued
a reprimand.

The Court rejected the suspension, in part,

because appellant's responsibilities as Attorney General
would be hampered by his suspension from the practice of law.
The Court thus effectively granted appellant immunity
and placed him above the Code for any penalty more severe than
reprimand.

This is error.

It shields the Attorney General from

discipline except reprimand, no matter how serious his misconduct may be.
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Further, the effect, if any, of a suspension from the
practice of law on the status of appellant as Attorney General
was not before the Court, and it was error for the court to
consider it.
POINT TWO

*********
THE CCURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DUTY OF PROTECTING
THE PUBLIC IN DETERMINING THE SANCTION TO APPLY TO
APPELLANT.
The primary purpose of the Code of Professional Conduct
and disciplinary proceedings thereunder is to protect the
public.

The legal profession holds a public trust, and has

been accorded the privilege of internal discipline, which the
Bar Commission submits has not been adequately exercised in this
case.
The Court failed to recognize the paramount interest of
the public in two respects.

First, the Court gave undue weight

to the education and committment devoted to the career of an
individual attorney, thereby establishing it as a competing
interest to be balanced against the protection of the public.
Secondly, the Court erred in holding that an attorney's license
to practice law should not be interfered with unless he is
guilty of culpable wrong, dishonesty or willful misconduct.
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Clearly, an attorney has an important property interest
in his license to practice law and it may not be interfered
with or revoked without due process.

Nonetheless, the standard

to be applied is noncompliance with the affirmative duties
imposed by the Code of Professional conduct--irrespective of
the presence of intent.

The public interest would obviously

require disbarment of an incompetent attorney despite the
best intentions on his part.
An attorney who is negligent may cause as much damage
to the public as one who is dishonest.

Particularly where the

negligence is, as it was here, gross, continuing and in disregard of the entreaties of clients.
excused with a reprimand.

Simple neglect may be

Gross and continuous neglect warrants

suspension or a more severe penalty.
POINT THREE

***********
THE COURT ERRED BY APPLYING AN IMPROPER STANDARD
OF REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS AND RECCMMENDATIONS OF
THE BAR CCMMISSION IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS.
In deciding this case, the Court held that the findings
and recommendations of the Bar Commission are merely advisory
since it is the sole responsibility of the Court to discipline
attorneys.

This holding ignores the clear weight of authority
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contained in previous decisions of this Court wherein it
was held that the Bar's findings and recommendations are
presumed to be correct and proper and that they will be
sustained unless found to be arbitrary, capricious or not
supported by substantial evidence.

In re Johnston,

524 P.2d

593, 594; In re Badger, 493 P.2d 1273; In re Wade, 497 P.2d
106; In re MacFarlane, 350 P.2d 631, 633; In re Fullmer,
405 P.2d 343, 344 (Ut. 1965).
It is undisputed that the Court has the final responsibilit
for disciplining attorneys who have violated the Code of
Professional Conduct.

However, the Court in its former

decisions has recognized, at least implicitly, that the Bar
that responsibility.

sha~

In MacFarlane, supra, the court noted

that the Bar Commission is uniquely qualified to fulfill this
role, stating:

On this problem it is relevant to observe that the
propriety of the questioned conduct must necessarily
be directed to the good conscience and ethical and
moral standards of members of the Bar, and that the
Bar Commissioners as its elected representatives are
peculiarly suited to be the arbiters of such standards. They are vitally concerned with the general
conduct of the Bar and its public relations and are
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also seriously concerned with a charge against a
fellow member such as that involved in the instant
proceeding.
350 P.2d at 633.
The Court has often stated that the judge or tribunal
hearing the evidence is in the best position to draw findings
and conclusions therefrom.

If this Court holds that the

Commission's findings and recommendations are merely advisory,
then it should have the benefit of more than the "cold" record
in determining the appropriate sanctions in this case.

It

would better enable the Court to fulfill its responsibility
to discipline attorneys if the Bar withdrew entirely from the
disciplinary process.

The Court should have the same opportun-

ity the hearing panel had to hear the testimony and observe the
demeanor of the witnesses.
In performing what is essentially a de novo review, the
Court was sorely deprived in having before it only the bare
transcript together with the briefs and abbreviated arguments
of counsel.
POINT FO"JR

**********
THE CCURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MATERIAL
ASPECTS OF APPELLANT'S CONDUCT IN DETERMINING
THE SANCTION TO APPLY.
The Bar Commission did not expressly find that appellant
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engaged in any dishonesty or willful or intentional misconduct.

Nor did the Commission find that appellant's

conduct constituted mere neglect or indiscretion.

The

majority opinion's characterization of appellant's conduct
in these terms is unsupported by the record and ignores the
gravamen of the findings against him.
With respect to Counts I and II, appellant's initial
misconduct was the result of simple negligence and inattention.
However, once the mistakes were called to his attention by
his clients and demands for accounting were made, his actions
became knowing and willful.

Appellant failed to make an

accounting upon the demand of the clients and later, their
attorneys.

He did not pay over the funds until complaints

were filed with the Bar.

He refused to assemble and turn over

his records until the eve of the hearing before the Bar
Commissioners.
In all of this, appellant knowingly and willfully put
his own interests before those of his clients.

Appellant in-

sisted on operating a part-time law practice in addition to
his full-time job of Deputy Attorney General.

In doing so, he

attempted to maximize his income at the expense of his clients,
Lowry and Emarine, and then sought to justify his misconduct
with the excuse that he was too busy or his records were too
disorganized.
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Some time after appellant became aware of his clients'
demands for accountin~s and disbursements, he decided to run
for elective office.

During his campaign, he continued to

refuse to account to his clients or their attorneys.

The

import of the Code of Professional Conduct is that an attorney
may not put his own interests ahead of the'client's when there
is a conflict.

Appellant, by his conduct, forced his clients

to take a back seat to his political ambitions.
Thus, what may have begun as neglect on appellant's part
took on a knowing and more serious character over the following
years due to his foot-dragging. His refusal to pay over moneys
to Mrs. Emarine until she produced cancelled checks from the
effects of her dead ex-husband, in order to prove they did not
bounce, is totally unjustifiable.

Appellant was in a far

better position to know whether the checks cleared since he
deposited them. Instead of accounting to Mrs. Emarine, he
forced her to prove to him that he owed her the money.
As of the date of the hearing, Mrs. Lowry still had
not been provided an accounting.

Her rights for additional

recovery have been totally foreclosed since the original
judgment debtor is dead.
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With respect to Count III, the majority opinion characterized the remarks of appellant as an "indiscretion".

However,

the court did not consider the fact that the statement was
made during a controversial trial in the midst of appellant's
political campaign.

There was no reason for appellant to

talk to the reporter in the first place--as a responsible
prosecutor, he should have declined comment.

His conduct

cannot be construed as an inadvertent slip of the tongue in
the performance of his duties.

When appellant encouraged

publicity, he was obligated to see to it that he did not make
statements which encroached on society's interest in maintaining free and fair trials.
The central theme running through the findings of the Bar
Commission and the supporting evidence is that appellant compounded his initial mistakes by constantly placing his own
interests--political and economic--ahead of those of his
clients and the public at-large.

This is contrary to the

lawyer's role which is to serve his clients and the interests
of justice.

The public trust, of which this Court is the

bulwark, demands protection from appellant's conduct.
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CONCLUSION

**********
The recommendation of the Bar was supported by the
evidence.

As has been pointed out in the responding brief of

the Bar Commission on appeal, the record reflects substantial
evidence of gross and continuing violations of the code of
such a nature to warrant suspension.

The Bar Commission

carefully considered the matter, exercised restraint, and
certainly did not act arbitrarily nor unreasonably.
Holding suspension is not warranted, ignores the substantiated weight of the evidence and constitutes err•r.
DATED this

51

dai111;;;~.<
VAR E.

STARK'

Attorney
2651 Washington Boulevard
Suite o. 10
O;Jde , Utah 84401

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
818 26th Street
o:Jden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Utah State Bar Commission
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